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With 420 million Internet users, China has become the world‟s largest Internet population. In terms of 
Internet security, this implies that the security of the Internet in China has become globally significant. 
In this investigation, cybercrimes in China are studied from both sociological as well as technical 
perspectives. The paper begins with a study into the state of the Internet development as well as the 
state of Internet security in China. An introduction is also given on the rise of Chinese hacktivists, the 
politically motivated hackers in China. This is followed by a detailed account of a recent case of 
Chinese hacktivism against Japan which has brought to light some valuable insights into the true state 
of hacktivism in China and the level of tolerance of the Chinese government towards politically 
motivated hacking. A top-down approach was then used to study and compare frameworks of 
cybercrime in the West and in China. It was found that not only do organised cybercrimes exist in 
China but also an underground economy as sophisticated as that in the West is flourishing at a rapid 
pace. Furthermore, estimates from Chinese security experts suggest that the size of the Chinese 
underground economy may well be much larger than that in the West. Lastly, the Chinese 
underground economy was studied in details by looking at the common ways in which Chinese 
cybercriminals trade as well as the pricing of the commonly traded goods, which are compared 
against the West. It was found that in general, while carding merchandises are similarly priced in 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
According to the Internet World Stats
1, the current total Internet population stands at around 1.9 
billion. For those living in the developed countries, the Internet has become so embedded in our daily 
lives that it is difficult to live without it, or at the very least, the absence of it would be of a great 
disadvantage. For those with good intent, the Internet is an indispensible tool because it gives them an 
unprecedented level and speed of access to information. Unfortunately, the Internet has also become 
an indispensible tool for those with criminal intent. Not only has it given them the potential access to 
millions of Internet users spanning hundreds of countries, it has also removed traditional boundaries 
of crime, such as geographical and jurisdictional boundaries (Home Office 2010). This in effect 
generates new opportunities for crime. Indeed, the consumers are well aware of the threat of Internet 
crime, or cybercrime.71% of consumers surveyed by CyberSource indicated their concern of the risk 
of online fraud and 50% still do not buy online (CyberSource 2010). Therefore, the advance in 
Internet security is critical to the growth of ecommerce.   
Prior to the availability of the Internet, cybercrimes have been primitive in nature and low in volume. 
However, the Internet has created new opportunities for crime and the reach of the criminals have 
been vastly extended. As societies become more reliant on the Internet, the amount of personal data 
that resides on the network increases dramatically. The financially motivated cybercriminals 
recognise this opportunity and have subsequently shifted to stealthier attacks with the aim of stealing 
personal data. Traditional organised crime gangs who are always on the lookout for new profiting 
opportunities have also been attracted.  As a result, a sophisticated underground economy of 
cybercriminals trading goods and services has emerged.  
With 420 million Internet users, China has become the single largest Internet population in the world 
according to Internet World Stats. Astonishingly, the Internet penetration rate in China is only 31.6%, 
which means that the Chinese Internet population has the potential to triple in size in the foreseeable 
future.  Just to give a clearer picture of the scale of the potential threat from China: the U.K. Internet 
population is just over 51million but its Internet penetration rate is already at 82.5%. When China 
eventually achieves the same level of penetration, the present U.K. Internet population would be 
equivalent to just around 5% of the Chinese Internet population. One potential threat is the emergence 
of huge botnets
2 in China, ones that could be too great in size for some nations to handle. The 
tendency for Chinese botherders
3 to launch DDoS
4 attacks against the West, including the U.K., has 
already been documented in the works of Zhuge et al. (Zhuge 2007). 
Perhaps due to the language barrier, while cybercrime in the West has been subject to intense study 
and research by the software vendors, security firms, law enforcement agencies and the academia, 
little attention has been paid towards cybercrime activities in China. As China is now the world‟s 
largest Internet population and the fact that cybercrimes have no bounds, the security of the Internet in 
China has profound implications on the global Internet. Therefore, it is the author‟s belief that in the 
interest for those responsible for cybersecurity, such as the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
the study of Chinese cybercrime and its underground economy is of both a critical and timely subject. 
 
                                                           
1 Internet World Stats (06/09/2010) - http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm  
2 Botnet: a botnet is a network of compromised machines (also known as zombies). Botnets are considered as 
the “Swiss Army knife of the underground economy” (Wilson 2008). 
3 Botherders: they are people who manage one or more botnets. 
4 DDoS: DDoS is an abbreviation for Distributed Denial of Service attacks, which are network attacks aimed at 
starving Web servers’ resources and preventing them from operating normally.  6 
 
1.1 Project aim 
The aim of this project is to carry out an in-depth investigation into cybercrimes and the underground 
economy in China. The results are compared with the findings of the similar activities in the West. 
The thesis should serve as a valuable intelligence report for the cybersecurity industry. 
1.2 Objectives 
In general, the project seeks to answer the following questions: 
1.  What are cybercrimes? 
2.  What are the models of cybercrimes in the West? E.g. their core characteristics 
3.  Are there any cybercrimes in China? Are they individuals or well organised organisations?  
4.  What are the similarities and differences between the cybercrimes and the underground 
economy in China and others?  
 
More precisely, the following questions should be answered upon the completion of the project: 
1.  What are the statistics of cybercrime incidents? 
2.  What is the state of the economy? 
3.  What are the motivations behind cybercriminals? 
4.  How do cybercriminals communicate? E.g. IRC channels, forums, QQ. Any popular/common 
venues for Chinese hackers? 
5.  Are there any particular “slangs” or specially crafted terms in the language the criminals use 
to communicate? They should be used in finding out relevant forums and identifying potential 
cybercriminals.  
6.   How do cybercriminals build trust?  
7.  What are the common distribution channels of stolen assets for hackers? 
8.  What are the common traded assets in the underground economy? 
9.  What are the characteristics of the underground economy in the different places? 
1.3 Organisation of thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 documents the study of the current state of the 
Internet in China, the rise of the Chinese hackers as well as the Internet regulations. Chapter 3 
provides a study of the nature of cybercrime and to compare and contrast frameworks of cybercrime 
documented in Chinese and Western literatures, including materials from SOCA. Chapter 4 
documents a detailed study into the underground economy in China and compared with the Western 









Chapter 2  China and the Internet 
With a population of 1.3 billion people, China‟s economy has become the world‟s centre of attention. 
In the last ten years or so, it has made tremendous growth at a frightening pace. Similarly, although 
the Internet was only made publically available during the mid 1990s, China has now become the 
world‟s largest Internet population with 420 million Internet users and the penetration rate is only 
32%. With such a large Internet population, the security of the Internet in China is now significant to 
the rest of the world. 
In this chapter, an introduction is given about the state of the Internet in China including the 
characteristics of the Chinese Web and its state of security. An introduction is also given to the rise of 
the Chinese cybercriminals and their characteristics are compared with those in the West. Finally, an 
introduction is given to the Internet regulations in China and compared with those in the West. 
2.1 Internet trends in China 
Below are some of the highlights from the latest Internet development report (Dec. 2009 – June 2010) 
compiled by the China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC): 
98.1% of Internet users in China accessed the Internet via a broadband connection. However, the 
connection speed may still be a problem, because according to Akamai, the average connection speed 
in China is only 695kbps. This is far lower than other large economies like the U.S. (4.6Mbps) U.K. 
(3.8Mbps) South Korea (12Mbps) and Japan (7.8Mbps) (Akamai 2010). 
CNNIC reported that 277 million people accessed the Internet via a handheld device and the growth 
rate for mobile Internet exceeds that of those who access the Internet using desktop stations. 
Characteristics of the Internet users 
54.8% of the Internet users were male and 45.2% female. The age distribution is as shown in figure 1 
below: 
 
Figure 1 - age distribution of Chinese internet users 2010 (CNNIC 2010) 
As shown in figure 1, 29.9% of the Internet users were aged 10 to 19 and 80.8% of Chinese Internet 
users were aged 10 to 39. Furthermore, the average age of Chinese Internet users is increasing and this 
can be seen by the fall in the percentage of Internet users aged 10 to 19 and 20 to 29 while there have 8 
 




Students continue to dominate the Internet population in China with an increase from 28.8% to 30.7%. 
There is also a significant increase in the number of self-employed users, a rise of 3.7% in six months. 
This could be due to the booming economy and increasing opportunities for business start-ups. This is 
supported by over 50% fall in the number unemployed users.  
The average monthly income distribution among the Internet users in China is as shown in figure 2 
below: 
 
Figure 2 - average monthly income of the Internet users in China 
Figure 2 shows that the most significant increase within this period lies in the number of Internet users 
with a monthly income of less than 500 RMB, an increase from 18% to 20.5%. 8.1% of the Internet 
users are still without income. This means that 28.6% of the users are with a monthly income of 500 
RMB or less.  Also, figure 2 show that 94.9% of the users have a monthly income of 5000 RMB 
(£ 479) or less. This is very low compared with developed countries like the U.K. where the average 
weekly income for full time employees is £ 489
7.  
Internet usage patterns 
During this period, China saw significant growth in Internet commerce. There is a 36.2% increase in 
Internet payments, 29.9% increase in Internet banking, 31.4% increase in Internet shopping and 
                                                           
5 The ageing UK internet population - http://www.nielsen-online.com/pr/pr_071218_UK.pdf 
6 Home Broadband Adoption 2009: Trends within demographic groups -
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/10-Home-Broadband-Adoption-2009/2-Trends-in-broadband-
adoption/2-Trends-within-demographic-groups.aspx 
7 Earnings: 2009 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings - http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=285 9 
 
19.4% increase in travel bookings. 31.5% of users use bulletin board systems (BBS)
8, an increase by 
13.1% and 70.5% of users play online games, an increase of 11.9%. 
2.2 Internet security in China 
According to the 2009 China Netizen
9 Information Security State Investigation Report (CNCERT/CC 
2010) jointly compiled by CNCERT/CC and CNNIC, the state of Internet security in China is as 
follows: 
In 2009, 95.6% of Internet users had security softwares installed but 4.4% were without. In other 
words, 18.5 million machines in China were left totally exposed to malware infections. This is of 
great concern as the machines could be infected to form botnets which could then be used to attack 
machines in other parts of the world.  
Malicious websites remain to be the primary source of infection with 77.6% of victims reported 
malware infection during web browsing. The second most popular infection channel is through 
removable drives at 26.9%.    
Interestingly, only 32.3% of infections resulted in the loss of QQ or email account logins, and 18.5% 
resulted in the loss of online game account logins. Only 2.5% resulted in the loss of online banking 
logins. One of the explanations for this is that approximately 46.6% of Internet users own some sort of 
virtual assets such as “QQ coins
10” and online game accessories. This suggests that the theft of virtual 
assets is more prominent in Chinese cybercrime than financial related crimes.  
According to 2009 Internet Security report
11 by Kingsoft Security
12, there were approximately 76 
million machines infected in 2009, an increase of 13.8% from 2008. 2009 saw a 49% increase in the 
number of new virus and Trojans detected. Symantec also reported a sharp rise in the number of new 
types of malware detected in 2009, an approximately 71% increase over 2008 (Symantec 2010).  
Lastly, Kingsoft reports that large scale high profile infection attacks are decreasing and attackers are 
choosing to use stealthier attacks. Again, this is echoed by the findings of Symantec (Symantec 2010). 
Attackers have gradually changed to stealthier infection tactics such as placing fraudulent download 
links, malicious redirections and browser hijacking.  
2.3 The rise of the Chinese cybercriminals 
Chinese hackers are frequently speculated in the West as being the masterminds behind cyber-attacks 
against foreign targets, the most recent high profile case being the attacks against Google CN. They 
are often portrayed as mystical and invisible, generating fear among Western nations. In this section, a 
short introduction is given on the rise of the Chinese hackers and how the Chinese hacking 
community evolved from a few highly skilled hacktivists
13 to a generation of cybercriminals. 
                                                           
8 Bulletin board systems (BBS):  they are equivalent to online forums 
9 Netizen is a popular label used to refer to the Internet users in China 
10 QQ is China’s most popular instant messenger service and “QQ coin” is their virtual currency. 
11 2009 China Computer Virus Infection State and Internet Security Report - 
http://www.cnetnews.com.cn/2010/0128/1615976.shtml 
12 Kingsoft Security is one of China’s most popular Internet security software vendors. See: 
http://www.duba.net/ 
13 Hacktivists: politically motivated hackers 10 
 
2.3.1  The Chinese hacktivists 
“Many young people are first enticed into cybercriminality by intrigue, by the challenge and by the 
promise of getting something for nothing” (McAfee 2006). The Chinese hackers are no different.  
According to Scott Henderson
14, the origin of Chinese hacking began in the mid-90s, as soon as the 
Internet was made available to the public (Henderson 2007).  1997 saw the emergence of two 
prominent hacker groups: 
  Green Army: formed by a hacker form Shanghai called Goodwill. It is reported to have had 
around 3000 members. The Green Army is said to have hacked an uncountable foreign 
websites and many of China‟s best hackers were members of this group. This group 
disbanded in 2000 (Henderson 2007). However, during this study, a popular hacker forum 
Isbase uses the exact same Chinese name which has 66,437 members (as of 14/09/2010).  
  China Eagle Union: founded by a person named Wan Tao, this group began in 1997 under 
the name Chinawill. Wan Tao then officially founded the China Eagle Union in 2000.  
These hackers groups were comprised mainly of males in their 20‟s and with the Internet, they were 
the few armed with the ability to voice their opinion and protest against national humiliations. This 
sense of nationalism stems from a century of national humiliation, as described by Callahan: 
“Chinese nationalism is not just about celebrating the glories of Chinese civilization; it also 
commemorates China‟s weakness. This negative image comes out most directly in the discourse of 
China‟s Century of National Humiliation. Chinese books on the topic generally tell the tale of China 
going from being at the centre of the world to being the Sick Man of Asia after the Opium War (1840) 
only to rise again with the Communist Revolution (1949)...The discourse of national humiliation 
shows how China‟s insecurities are not just material, a matter of catching up to the West militarily 
and economically, but symbolic. Indeed, one of the goals of Chinese foreign policy has been to 
„cleanse National Humiliation‟.” (Callahan 2004). 
The Chinese hacktivists, also known as “honkers”, finally got the chance to show the world their 
abilities when anti-Chinese riots were held in Indonesia in 1998. Outraged by the events, the hacker 
groups were united under a common goal and they jointly formed the “Chinese Hacker Emergency 
Conference Center”. They sent email bombs to the Indonesian government websites and mailboxes as 
well as carrying out DDoS attacks against Indonesian domestic websites. Their actions gain the 
attention of the chief-editor of China Byte
15 and the news began to viral amongst the subscribers and 
eventually made it to newspapers headline. This event is one of the most significant events in China‟s 
history of hacking as it has shown the hackers that their attacks really did make an impact and they 
were not forced to swallow indignation (Henderson 2007). This marks the beginning of a hacking 
alliance with a sacred duty to protect the country‟s interests as well as dignity in the face of 
humiliation. 
Another significant event was the cyber conflict with Taiwan in 1999. It was launched in response to 
Taiwan‟s “Two states theory”. It is in this event which saw the first Chinese-made malicious software, 
called the “Glacier” Trojan. It is claimed that Glacier is the inspiration behind other malware such as 
the infamous Huigezi Trojan. Chinese hackers no longer had to rely on foreign hacking tools. 
                                                           
14 Scott Henderson is a retired language expert in the U.S. Army and is now working in open source intelligence. 
15 China Byte – one of China’s leading IT media and wireless service providers. See: http://www.chinabyte.com  11 
 
The year 2000 saw a major change in the hacktivist community. The Green Army broke up in the heat 
of commercialisation. Due to the naming convention, it is believed that the offsprings of the Green 
Army went on to form the security firm NSFocus
16. Furthermore, several large hacker groups emerged: 
  Honker Union of China (HUC): founded by a hacker operating under the online name Lion 
(his real name is Lin Yong). At the height of popularity, it is reported that there were as many 
as 80,000 members in this group. However, this group was disbanded by Lion in late 2004 as 
he believed the group no longer hold the same passion as in the beginning (Henderson 2007). 
During this study, it was found that some suggests Lion disbanded HUC because it was being 
monitored by the government. Perhaps due to the significance of its name, there are two 
forums using this name, as shown in figures 3 and 4 below: 
 
Figure 3 – the forum of cnhonkerarmy (http://www.cnhonkerarmy.com)  
 
Figure 4 – the BBS of the Honker Union of China (http://www.honker.net) 
 
  Javaphile: this group was founded by a hacker named Coolswallow and all members were 
said to be students of Jiaotong University in Shanghai. Javaphile is behind the defacement of 
Lite-on and Fox T.V.. This is the same university accused of being involved in the attacks 
                                                           
16 NSFocus - http://www.nsfocus.com/ 12 
 
against Google CN back in January 2010
17. Allegedly, Coolswallow is now an information 
security consultant for China‟s Public Security Bureau
18. 
It is important to distinguish the Chinese honkers from hackers because honkers have a strict code of 
conduct on not hacking within China. They see themselves as different from the hackers. Figure 5 
below shows a recent post on honker.net announcing the banning of a member for hacking within 
China:  
 
Figure 5 - banning a honker for hacking within China 
2.3.2  The Chinese government and the hacktivists 
There have been many speculations by the Western media about a direct link between the Chinese 
government and the hacking community. To date, there is no conclusive evidence which shows that 
the Chinese government is the mastermind behind the reported attacks.   
Recently, the Information Warfare Monitor carried out network forensic examinations on the infected 
Tibetan computer systems and found that some command and control servers used in the attack were 
located in China (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) and (Information Warfare Monitor 2010). 
Furthermore, there is little doubt that China is the biggest strategic beneficiary to the stolen 
documents from the targeted machines. Interestingly, an email address used to register a domain name 
(lookbytheway.net) utilised by the command and control servers was traced by Henderson as having 
also been used to register accounts on hacker forums such as Xfocus
19 and Isbase
20. The individual is 
                                                           
17 Chinese schools deny link to Google attack - http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61I0OS20100221 
18 Javaphile, Buddhism, and…The Public Security Bureau? - 
http://www.thedarkvisitor.com/2007/12/javaphile-buddhism-andthe-public-security-bureau/ 
19 XFocus - https://www.xfocus.net/bbs/index.php?lang=cn 
20 Isbase – http:// http://bbs.isbase.net/ 13 
 
born on July 24, 1982, lives in Chengdu. Sichuan and attended the University of Electronic Science 
and Technology of China. Interestingly, Chengdu is also the location of one of the People‟s Liberation 
Army (PLA)‟s technical reconnaissance bureaus tasked with signals intelligence collection 
(Information Warfare Monitor 2010). While the findings do not link the Chinese government with the 
foreign hacking incidents, they nonetheless show an obvious link to the Chinese hacking community.  
However, according to a report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, there 
are several reasons why hacker groups would not be part of formal PLA plans as part of a computer 
network operation (CNO) campaign in wartime: 
  Command and Control: the lack of an easily implemented command and control structure 
from the PLA to the hacker community makes guiding or directed attacks extremely difficult. 
  Precision targeting: hacktivist target selection is generally based on political or nationalist 
symbolism and not on an alignment with real or perceived PLA campaign objectives and may 
actually hinder PLA operations or intelligence gathering. 
  Indications and warning: surprise and deception are central to successful attacks but the 
hacker groups are mostly public (Krekel 2009). 
Even though it is unlikely that the hacking community would be a formal part of the PLA‟s plan, their 
presence and actions such as the attacks on the Tibetans are nonetheless beneficial for the government. 
This suggests that the Chinese government would continue to hold such informal relationship with the 
hacking community. Henderson suggests that the Chinese government tends not to prosecute hackers 
unless they attack within China
21. This is evident in a recent case of hacktivism against Japan which is 
documented in the following section. 
Lastly, there is evidence which shows that the Chinese government are becoming increasingly active 
in closing down hacker forums, especially those disseminating hacking tools. This is in line with 
China‟s announcement of tough tackling on cybercrime (IOSC 2010). 
 
Figure 6 - reassurance with regards to recent crack down on hacker forums 
                                                           
21 Chinese Hacker “Community” exposed - http://www.darkgovernment.com/news/chinese-hacker-
community/ 14 
 
Back in February 2010, the Chinese government closed one of the most popular hacker forums called 
“Black Eagle”. The reason was that the forum had been offering training to some 12,000 hackers and 
had received more than 7 million RMB (US$1 million) from training provision
22. However, it was 
found that the “Black Eagle” forum is now back online. In July, a large number of hacker forums 
were also closed down. It was so significant that a prominent member of the Honker Union of China 
made an announcement (figure 6) to the members to reassure them that they should have nothing to 
worry about because they are different from the other hackers and the forum has always discouraged 
people from malicious hacking.  
2.3.3  A recent case study of Chinese hacktivism 
On the 8
th September 2010, the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler was held by the Japanese after a 
collision with two Japanese patrol vessels, near the highly sensitive Diaoyu Island in the East China 
Sea
23. Predictably, this incident has drawn the attentions of some Chinese hacktivists.   
Since the incident, there have been several rumours about launching cyberattacks against Japan. 
Interestingly, an advert
24 (figure 7) was found to have been widely disseminated across Chinese 
forums rallying Chinese hacktivists into participating in a coordinated attack on 18
th September 2010.  
 
Figure 7 – advert rallying hacktivists to participate in a coordinated attack against Japan on cfdd.org.cn 
It is claimed on the advert that the rally comes from the founding members of the Honker Union of 
China (http://www.honker.net) and the aim of the attack is to “hang the flag of the nation” on various 
large Japanese websites, to disrupt their servers and to destroy databases, thereby punishing the 
Japanese for their actions. The advert in figure 7 is believed to be the original post and it was found on 
a forum dedicated for protecting Diaoyu Island. 
                                                           
22 Hubei cyberpolice successfully closed down China’s largest hacker training website -
http://news.qq.com/a/20100206/001649.htm 
23 Japan arrests Chinese skipper intense maritime row - 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100908/wl_asia_afp/chinajapanmaritimeincidentdiplomacy_2010090804173
4 
24 Founding members of Honker Union of China: 9.12 – 9.18 coordinated attack announcement - 
http://www.cfdd.org.cn/bbs/thread-71680-1-1.html 15 
 
Three interesting details are also specified: 
1.  QQ groups (#5209614, #5210969 and core group #27437332) are setup to coordinate the 
attacks. A channel on a team voice tool called YY
25 is also setup. 
2.  Novices are also invited to participate in the attack by using ready-made tools which are 
claimed to be available in the QQ groups specified above. 
3.  A long list of targeted Japanese websites is published. The list includes many official websites 
such as the Japanese Ministry of Justice, the Prime Minister and His Cabinet as well as the 
Fire and Disaster Management Agency. Large corporate websites are also in the list. 
The author of the thesis has attempted to join the QQ groups but two groups (each with a maximum of 
100 members) were already full and membership in the core group is by invitation only. 
Interestingly, as shown in figure 7 below, the administrator of the forum Honker Union of China 
(http://www.honker.net) denies making such rally call and discourage people from participating 
because real attacks are carried out silently, not publicised as shown. He believes that defacing 
websites is of very little benefit to China. Rather, stealthier attacks such as infiltration and spying 
have a much greater value. Finally, he believes that such attacks would only give other governments 
the excuse to increase funding for cyber-defence, such as the U.S.. Subsequently, the author of the 
thesis went on to try and verify the source of the advert in figure 7. By browsing through the “Red 
hacker” bar
26 on Baidu Tieba, it seems clear that the advert is the work of an individual or a minority 
of hackers. 
 
Figure 8 – denial of rally call by Honker Union of China 
However, this is not the only initiative on attacking Japanese websites. There is another Chinese 
hacktivist forum (http://www.cnhonkerarmy.com) ,which although they does not use the name 
Honker Union of China, their logo does bear the initials HUC. On the 13
th Sept 2010, this group claim 
to have already attacked and defaced several Japanese websites and they have even displayed their 
work like a trophy: 
                                                           
25 YY team voice tool - http://yy.duowan.com/ 
26 “Red hacker” bar, Baidu Tieba - http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kw=%BA%EC%BF%CD 16 
 
 
Figure 9 - showcasing the defacement of a Japanese website on cnhonkerarmy 
The hackers of cnhonkerarmy defaced websites by changing the homepage to a page as shown above. 
The page clearly indicates that the website has been hacked by cnhonkerarmy. The page also demands 
an official apology from the Japanese government and at the bottom of the page reads a line “The war 
was left unfinished 5 years ago, we will continue the fighting. This is just a little warning, Japan 
please self-respect”. 
 
Figure 10 - cnhonkerarmy forum under DDoS attack from Japan 
From various sources on the Chinese web, it was found that the cnhonkerarmy forum was only 
launched a few months ago. However, it appears that they are actually the same group of hackers who 
launched a cyber-attack against the Japanese back in July 2005
27. The group disbanded some time 
after the attack in 2005 but has now regrouped. 
                                                           




th Sept. 2010, the administrator of cnhonkerarmy claimed that the forum has been under a heavy 
DDoS attack and the origin of attack has been traced back to Japan as shown in figure 10 above. 
While the author of the thesis was attempting to access a page on the forum on the same day, an “out 
of memory” error was given, as shown in figure 11 below.  This suggests that the load on the server 
was being strained, possibly by a DDoS attack. 
 
Figure 11 - "out of memory" error given while accessing cnhonkerarmy 
On 15
th Sept. 2010, a member of the HUC technical team made an announcement claiming that their 
attack which began on the 12
th Sept., was a tremendous success. This is shown in figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12 - cnhonkerarmy claiming their cyberattack on Japan as a tremendous success 
They also claimed that despite suffering some losses of their own, their goal was achieved nonetheless. 
Most importantly, they claimed that the Chinese government has intervened under increasing pressure 
from foreign countries and media. Subsequently, the groups have decided to temporarily pause all 
attacks on Japan to avoid giving foreign countries the excuse to attack China. 
On 22
nd Sept. 2010, it was found that both honker.net and cnhonkerarmy.com have been taken down. 
Although the exact reasons are unknown, it is reasonable to assume that they have been taken down 
by the Chinese government due to the increasing pressure from foreign media. 
There are several implications from the above findings: 
  Hacktivism in China is active and hacktivists are easily rallied by public announcements 
  QQ groups and the YY team voice tool are popular tools to be used for coordination 
  There has not been any clear evidence of a widespread collaboration between the hacker 
groups to attack Japan. One possible reason is the increased level of monitoring by the 
Chinese government agencies. 18 
 
  This is evidence demonstrating the Chinese government willingness to intervene with 
cyberattacks from hackers. However, the group has not made any claim that any participant 
has been arrested as a result of the attack which shows government leniency. 
Finally, findings from the observations above share some similarities with the Russian hacktivists: 
  When attacks are arranged, the necessary attack tools are disseminated in order to allow 
novice hackers to participate 
  Novices are encouraged into participation by being exposed to patriotic materials 
  List of targeted websites is published 
  Coordination and discussion prior to attack including the selection of tools (Project Grey 
Goose 2008) 
2.3.4  Size of the hacking community in China 
To get an idea of the size of the hacker community in China, Henderson carried an investigation in 
2006 and subsequently concluded with an estimation of approximately 380,000 active hackers in 
China with a lower limit of around 24,000 and an upper limit of 1.2 million (Henderson 2007). 
To get an updated view, the author of this thesis examined some 19 forums by following the affiliated 
links on the forums. The findings were as below:    
 
Table 1 – membership in hacking forums in China 
As shown in table 1, there are around 3.6million registered users amongst the 19 forums studied. 
While this is by no means an accurate reflection of the true size of the hacker community due to the 
possibility of duplicate memberships held by an individual as well as the inactive users, it nonetheless 
URL  Registered? 
No. of registered 
members 
Highest no. of 
online users 
http://hackbase.com  n  1,111,335  11000 
http://bbs.77169.com   n  956,715  12739 
http://bbs.hmwz.net/   y  432,922  N/A 
http://bbs.mmbest.com/index.php   y  254,969  5500 
http://www.eviloctal.com  y  204,496  10875 
http://bbs.neteasy.cn    y  134,109  2213 
http://bbs.honker.net   y  80,543  5500 
http://www.patching.net/bbs/  n  78,718  N/A 
http://bbs.isbase.net/  n  66,437  5500 
http://www.hx99.net/bbs/  y  52,940  714 
https://www.xfocus.net/bbs/   y  51,249  5433 
http://yeshack.com  y  45,265  3061 
http://bbs.7747.net    y  35,649  4463 
http://www.hack95.com/   n  29,874  3463 
http://www.3800-hk.cn/  y  23,409  1226 
http://www.hackersa.org/   y  16,760  9122 
http://bbs.hackvip.com   y  14,019  815 




9,460  592 
 
Total  3,612,233  97436 
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does reflect the popularity of hacking in China. The number of online users at any one time also 
suggests that there are potentially a high number of active hackers in China.  Lastly, the popularity of 
Hackbase and the fact that it has stopped taking in new members suggests that the demand for 
membership affiliation with a reputable hacking group is so high it is almost cult-like in China. This 
further highlights the popularity of hacking in China. 
2.3.5  Emergence of cybercriminals 
One can begin to see why Chinese cybercriminals have emerged by comparing the average income 
between countries. As stated in section 2.1, 94.9% of the Internet users in China have an average 
monthly income of less than 5,000 RMB (£ 479), equivalent to the average weekly salary in the 
U.K.
28.This is comparable to Russia where the average monthly wage in Moscow is officially only 
around 17,000 rubles (£360) per month (Jellenc 2007).  
Also, just like their Russian counterparts, the Chinese I.T. employees are generally better off than 
most in the economy. According to CNET
29, the average monthly income for a programmer with 2-3 
years of experience is 3,000 to 6,000 RMB (£286 to £573). This varies between provinces and 
industry. Those in game development could earn as much as 8,000 to 10,000 RMB per month (£764 
to £955). A programmer working in larger corporations with 5 years experience typically earns 
between 12,000 to 15,000 RMB per month (£1,146 to £1433).  Assuming £1 ,433 is an above average 
salary in the Chinese I.T. industry then an above average annual salary for a Chinese I.T. employee is 
£17,196. This is almost twice as low as their counterparts in the U.K., who on average earns £35,000 
per year. 
Obviously, one may suspect if there is such a big difference in the average income between the 
countries, perhaps the price of the goods sold would also differ by similar margins. This is not always 
the case. E.g. the price for a 13” Macbook Pro 2.4 GHz
30 costs 9,498 RMB (£908) in China and the 
exact same model costs £999
31 in the U.K.. 
Furthermore, it has been widely reported that some Chinese cybercriminals, normally in their late 
teens to early 20‟s, are making as much as 50,000 RMB (£ 4,778) per month and a zero-day exploit
32 
can be sold for as much as a million
33. 
Lastly, the education system in China is similar to that in Russia where strong emphasis has been 
placed on computer related subjects like Mathematics and Science, perhaps stemming from their 
common Communist root.  According to Li et al., the Chinese students also appear to be more 
confident with computers than their U.K. counterparts although the sample size in the study may have 
been too small to be conclusive (Li 2005).  The Chinese dominance in top three finishing of the 
International Olympiad in Informatics in 2007 and 2008 also reflects their proficiency with 
informatics.  
Therefore, with an average salary much lower than that of their Western counterparts, who some may 
perceive as intellectually inferior, and coupled with factors such as distance from victim and falling 
                                                           
28 Earnings: 2009 Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings - http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=285 
29 Which level are you at? An investigation on the state of survival for the IT people -  
http://www.cnetnews.com.cn/2010/0311/1659908.shtml 
30 MacBook Pro (CN) - http://www.apple.com.cn/store/macbookpro/ 
31 MacBook Pro (UK) http://store.apple.com/uk/browse/home/shop_mac/family/macbook_pro 
32 Zero-day exploit: a zero-day exploit refers to a vulnerability in an application not yet noticed by the 
developers 
33Uncovering the Internet Gang’s Chinese Landscape: an 18 year old hacker’s lavish lifestyle - 
http://tech.163.com/09/0608/00/5B8D91KT000915BF.html 20 
 
skills required in committing cybercrime (Wall 2008), it really is no surprise that to see the emergence 
of cybercriminals and a flourishing underground economy in China.  
2.4 Cyber-regulations and law enforcements in China 
According to Qi et al., the first piece of Chinese legislation on cybercrimes was enacted in 1997 and it 
is the Criminal Law of the People Republic of China which provides the basis of conviction and 
punishment. The cybercrime-related articles in the Law are 285, 286 and 287.  
Other relevant regulations include: 
  “Regulations on protecting the safety of computer information”, 1997 
  “Regulations on State Secrets Administration for International Networking of Computer 
Information Systems”, 2000 
  “Decision of by the State Committee of the National People‟s Congress Concerning 
Maintaining Internet Security”, 2000 
According to Qi et al., there are several notable shortcomings with the laws and regulations 
documented above. Firstly, the punishment laid out by the Criminal Law fails to correlate 
proportionately with the tremendous social harm as the result of the cybercrimes. Secondly, the law 
offers little protection for rights of the individual users or networks. They concluded that cybercrime 
legislation in China is still in the very early stages of development and more specific laws targeting 
cybercrimes should be considered. 
According to Yong, Article 286 in the Criminal Law fails to take into account data that is stored 
outside of the computer information system, such as on removable drives. Therefore even if the 
consequences are serious, this conduct cannot be punished in accordance to the Article (Yong n/a). 
Another problem with Article 286 is its definition of “destructive programmes” which fails to take 
into non destructive programmes such as Trojans which do not necessarily affect the normal operation 
of the computer system. This may contribute to the reason why data stealing is becoming more 
prominent than high profile virus infections. 
However, China is not the only nation with an insufficient legal framework against cybercrime. Due 
to the evolving natures of cybercrime, legal frameworks are needed to be constantly updated to be 
sufficient (Peiravi 2010). 
With regards to law enforcement, Lu et al. made an interesting comparison of cybercrimes and 
governmental law enforcement in China and the United states. “China has historically been a 
communitarian society where individual rights typically yield to the interests of the community and 
society, which is a direct contrast with the more individualistic ideology in the U.S.” (Lu 2010). 
Moreover, they found that due to China‟s communitarian orientation, Chinese authority is much more 
receptive to informal social control than the U.S. where formal social control is preferred. Lastly, in 
China, the suppression of crime and protection of public safety are regarded more highly than 
individual rights. In contrast, the fundamental goal of the legal system in the U.S. is to protect 





Chapter 3  Framework of Cybercrime  
As documented in the last chapter, China has seen the rapid emergence of cybercrime since Internet 
has been made publicly available. In this chapter, a top-down approach is used to study and compare 
frameworks of cybercrime. The chapter begins by defining the nature of cybercrime and to study why 
it has become such a plague for the Internet users today. This is then followed by a comparison of the 
frameworks of cybercrime which have been documented in Chinese and Western literatures, leading 
to a generalised framework. 
3.1 Understanding cybercrime 
To study cybercrime, it is important to first understand what cybercrime is. The term “cybercrime” is 
in fact, largely an invention of the media, just like the term “cyberspace”, which originates from the 
novel Neuromancer (Jewkes 2010). While “cyberspace” is now casually used to refer to the imaginary 
“space” on the Internet, “cybercrime” is used to refer to the crimes committed over this “space”.  
3.1.1  Definition of cybercrime 
Symantec has defined cybercrime as “any crime that is committed using a computer, network, or 
hardware device” (Fossi 2008).  Wall has a somewhat different explanation: “cybercrimes are 
understood here to be criminal or harmful activities that involve the acquisition or manipulation of 
information for gain” (Wall 2008). While the first two definitions highlight the importance of the 
involvement of technologies in cybercrimes, Wall‟s unique definition has added that cybercrime is 
about intangible information rather than tangible assets such as physical goods. This is indeed true 
because the Internet is essentially a global network of users sharing information with one another. The 
Internet is all about informational transfer and it is the speed of this informational transfer which has 
led to its rapid growth. Barlow supports this view by describing the cyberspace as “a virtual 
environment in which economic value is attached to ideas and their virtual expression rather than 
physical property” (Wall 2008).  
From the above definitions, it can be generalised that cybercrime refers to any crime that involves: 
1.  The acquisition or manipulation of information, rather than physical assets, for personal gain  
2.  The use of new technologies such as computers, networks and hardware devices. 
3.1.2  Characteristics of cybercrime and the Internet 
In order to identify the distinctive characteristics of cybercrime, Wall used what he called a 
“transformation test”, a heuristic which highlights the significant transformations that have made 
cybercrimes distinctive from traditional crimes (Wall 2008). The transformations he observed are 
summarised as below: 
1.  Networking and the convergence of technologies: technologies are becoming increasingly 
interoperable. 
2.  Informational transfer and value: on the Internet, value is attached mainly to intangible 
ideas and information rather than tangible assets. The focus of cybercrime is to acquire 
information in order to extract its values. 
3.  Globalization: the collapse of traditional geographies of distance. This has created 
informational crime opportunities across cultures and jurisdictions by extending the reach of 
criminals globally. 
Sandywell also recognised the need for such characterisation and his observations extend Wall‟s list. 
He identified the following: 22 
 
1.  Instantaneous information transmission enabled by the Internet. 
2.  The anonymity or “facelessness” of cyberspace. 
3.  Material incorruptibility of materials that can be reproduced without degradation in quality. 
4.  Manipulability of digitally coded electronic information as integrity can easily be 
compromised (Sandywell 2010). 
The Internet has also torn down the traditional boundaries of crime such as geographical and 
jurisdictional boundaries. This makes cybercrime especially difficult to control because any 
prosecution would require the collaboration from law enforcement agencies over the globe. Also, the 
Internet has given the cybercriminals the option of harbouring in countries with a poor legal 
framework such as the developing countries. Such countries act as safe havens for cybercriminals. 
The most important feature is anonymity, which refers to the ability to hide one‟s true identity from 
another. Anonymity is implicitly facilitated by the architecture of the Internet and it is perhaps one of 
the most influential factors that motivate people into committing crimes over the Internet. However, 
one must remember that anonymity can also be preserved by using the telephone to carry out criminal 
activities. However, using a telephone, a criminal is required to interact with the victim personally. On 
the other hand, communication over the Internet is fully mechanised. Over the Internet, one only has 
to interact with the computational device that is used to access the Internet. It is this sense of distance 
from the victims that has motivated criminals into committing cybercrimes. This is noted by Wall 
when he asked convicted internet fraud offender whether he would have gotten into crime had the 
internet not been involved.  The offender replied: “for me the internet made it, it was anonymous; you 
just tapped your details into the web page.” (Wall 2008).The importance of  the sense of distance from 
the victim is further highlighted when Wall asked the offender if he could have rung a vendor and 
ordered the same goods over the phone, the offender replied: “no way, if it was face to face…then no 
way. It was a specific opportunity that arose”.  
3.1.3  Typology of cybercrime 
As described in the above section, the identification of the unique characteristics of cybercrime would 
help the reasoning behind the decisions made by the cybercriminals as well as the emergent 
frameworks of cybercrime. In this section, the general types of cybercrime are discussed.  
The three main types of cybercrime as identified by both Grabosky (Grabosky 2007) and Wall (Wall 
2008) are as follows: 
1.  Computer integrity crimes 
2.  Computer assisted (or related) crimes 
3.  Computer content crimes 
Computer integrity crimes are crimes with the aim of disrupting the integrity of computer systems. 
Thus, computer integrity crimes are crimes where the computers are the target of criminal activities. 
The cybercrimes falling into this category include hacking, cracking, spying, vandalising, 
denial/disruption of service, digital piracy and the infection of malicious software (malware). These 
are crimes which seek to exploit the manipulability as well as the incorruptibility of digital data, as 
described in the previous section.  
Computer assisted (or related) crimes refer to the traditional crimes committed with the use of 
computers, or in other words, computers as instruments of crime. This category of crime usually 
involve the acquisition of sensitive information, such as personal information, through techniques 
such as spamming, phishing and social engineering, and the ultimate goal is to utilise the acquired 
information for personal gain.  23 
 
Lastly, computer content crimes are crimes where the involvement of computers is insignificant, or in 
another word, incidental to the actual crime committed. Crimes falling into this category are more 
sensitive to regional laws than the other two categories but generally, the distribution of child 
pornographic materials as well as the promotion of hate and extremist ideas fall into this category. 
The three categories of cybercrimes above have subsequently led to the emergence of three distinctive 
groups of criminals involved in cybercrimes (Choo 2008a): 
1.  Traditional organised criminal groups 
2.  Organised cybercriminal groups 
3.  Ideologically and politically motivated cybercrime groups 
Traditional organised criminal groups refer to those which have existed long before the prevalence of 
cybercrime and are actively engaged in real world offences such as drug trafficking and human 
trafficking. This group of criminals are mainly driven by financial gain and are always actively 
seeking new opportunities in order to increase their wealth. These criminals have recognised value of 
technologies in facilitating the commission of crime as well as the identification of new opportunities 
and circumventing law enforcement restrictions. According to Paget, online extortions and digital 
piracy are already being exploited out by China‟s longest running triad, the Sanhehui (McAfee 2009). 
Information from SOCA has also revealed that traditional organised criminal groups are also 
“increasingly using false and stolen identities to commit non-fiscal frauds” (Choo 2008a).  
Organised cybercriminal gangs are those that operate exclusively over the Internet. Choo suggests that 
such organisations are more loosely structured flexible, transnational and tend to have smaller 
membership sizes. Furthermore, they are more temporal and would go their separate ways after 
successfully accomplishing the tasks at hand.  
Lastly, the ideologically and politically motivated cybercrime groups are those who use the Internet to 
disseminate their ideas as well as to facilitate their extremist activities. There are emerging trends that 
extremists and traditional organised crime groups have converged and that both have used the Internet 
to finance their offline activities, such as through online credit card frauds.  
3.2 Comparison of organised cybercrime in China and the West 
It is now rare to see cybercrimes being committed by lonely individuals. At present, most cybercrimes 
are committed by organisations of cybercriminals who are motivated by financial gain. This trend 
applies to both China and the Western countries such as the U.S., U.K. and Eastern European 
countries like Russia and Romania. In this chapter, several high profile case studies from China and 
Western countries are introduced. 
3.2.1  Case studies in China 
The two most high profile cases regarding cybercrimes in China are documented below, both of 
which demonstrates the existence of organised cybercrime in China.  24 
 
The first and perhaps the most famous case
34 with 
regards to cybercrime in China occurred in 2006 when 
Li Jun, the author of the Panda worm (a.k.a. “Panda 
Burning Joss Stick”) met online with Wang Lei, a Web 
Master and Zhang Sun, an Envelopes Stealer. Li Jun 
and Wang Lei set up several websites which infected 
visitors with the Panda virus. Furthermore, they sold 
traffic to Zhang Sun by allowing him to link his Web-
based Trojans to the websites. Subsequently, the 
visitors to the websites were infected by several 
Trojans and virtual goods, mainly online game and QQ 
logins were stolen. Millions of machines were believed 
to have been infected across China and the losses due 
to this incident were estimated to be up to 100 million 
RMB (US $14 million). Li Jun made an estimated 
profit of around 150,000 RMB (US$ 22,156) (Zhuge 
2008). In February 2007, Li Jun and his accomplices 
were caught by uncover police pretending to be a 
potential buyer for his malware
35. This case is widely believed to be the first case which brought to 
light the underground virus production chain in China. The virus author Li Jun, as shown in figure 13, 
was aged 25 in 2007. He claimed that he only began using computers in 1999 in Internet cafes and he 
quickly began writing viruses as a hobbyist. However, after he was asked to sell his Trojan, he 
believed he could make money from it and subsequently continued his actions.  
 
Figure 14 – the underground economy chain in China exposed 
                                                           
34 Revealing the Internet virus production chain behind “Panda Burning Joss Stick” -
http://news.china.com/zh_cn/news100/11038989/20070217/13946944.html 
35 Shanghai Youth Newspaper: The true story behind the “Panda burning joss stick” case - 
http://it.sohu.com/20070214/n248244529.shtml 
Figure 13 - Li Jun, the author of the Panda worm 25 
 
The second case occurred in 2007 to 2008 when a cybercriminal group illegally produced and traded 
more than 40 variants of a Trojan known as “Gentle” which targeted stealing online game accounts 
and passwords. The investigation into the group‟s activities has exposed a flourishing underground 
economy and malware production chain in China.  
The criminal gang began when Trojan authors Lu and Zhang wrote more than 40 variants of a Trojan 
targeting online games. Zhang then asked his friend Zheng to distribute the series of Trojans and 
Zheng accepted the request and traded using his girlfriend Chen‟s online name “Gentle”. Lu also 
allowed Zhang Fan and Zhang Jin Wang to act as primary sellers to sell the Trojans. Within one year, 
they have managed to steal over 5.3million online gaming accounts and passwords. The Trojan 
authors Lu and Zhang made a profit of around 645,000 RMB, which is equivalent to approximately 
94,534 U.S. dollars. 
This case involved 16 provinces with more than a hundred people involved with the investigation and 
concerns as much as 30 million RMB (US$4 million). A translation of the depiction of the virus 
production chain concerning the “Gentle” Trojan is as shown in figure14 above. Eleven people were 
prosecuted
36 for the involvement in the dissemination of malware. Of these eleven men, eight had 
received university level education and ten were born after 1980 with the youngest being 22 years old. 
From the two above cases, it can be seen that there is little doubt that organised cybercrime exists in 
China but further proof was needed to proof whether an underground economy exists in China. The 
author of this thesis subsequently went on to search for more information on the “underground 
economy” and it turns out that the existence of it has already been widely reported by Chinese 
security firms and the media. The level of attention from the Chinese media indicates that this is of a 
great concern for the Chinese Internet population. Figure 15 is a translated version of a widely 
distributed depiction of the underground economy chain in China.  
3.2.2  Case studies in the West 
One noticeable difference between the underground economy in China and the West is that markets 
most often exist in the form of forums and IRC
37 channels (Thomas 2006) in the West but these are 
rarely mentioned in cybercrime cases in China. Western online black markets have been known to 
exist in as early as 2002.  
The first major organised cybercrime case in the West which brought to the light existence of an 
elaborate underground economy concerned an online forum called ShadowCrew which was dedicated 
to carding activities.  
ShadowCrew began operation in 2002 and it was a safe haven for carders and hackers to trade goods 
and services with free membership. It offered contents in both English and Russian in order to 
increase geographical dispersion of its members so that the availability of cash-out and drop
38 
locations would increase. Shadowcrew was shut down by the U.S. and international law enforcement 
agencies in Operation Firewall in 2004 (Fossi 2008). 
                                                           
36 “Gentle Trojan” exposes underground information market, concerning nearly RMB 30million - 
http://society.people.com.cn/GB/10618004.html 
37 Internet Relay Chat (IRC): an Internet Communications protocol using a client-server model which offered 
real-time group communications, requires little bandwidth and the client applications required to access the 
service are freely available.   
38 Drop – an intermediary location at which carders could use as delivery address for physical goods bought 
with fraudulent cards. They are also used to refer to intermediary bank accounts used in money laundering.  
 
 
Figure 15 – a translated version of a mapping of the underground economy “production chain” in China
39Case studies in the West 
                                                           
39Investigation into hacker production chain: the formation of an underground virus trading market. Available at:  http://news.qq.com/a/20090630/000190.htm  
 
 
Figure 16 – a screenshot of the Shadowcrew forum in 2002 
Another noticeable online forum which was shut down by Operation Firewall was called the 
CarderPlanet, which was created by a man named Script. CarderPlanet operated in similar fashion to 
ShadowCrew and as its name suggests, it is another carding forum. Script‟s real name is Dmitry 
Golubov, now an Ukrainian cybercriminal turned politician. In 2001, Goulubov held a meeting at a 
restaurant in Odessa, Ukraine with 150 other interested people from Eastern Europe. Soon after the 
meeting, he decided to launch CarderPlanet in order to facilitate underground carding (Paget 2010). 
Script was reportedly earning up to $100,000 U.S. dollars a day (Fossi 2008). In July 2004, Golubov 
closed CarderPlanet claiming it has attracted too much attention from law enforcements. 
A more recent case with regards to online carding forums is the high profile closure of the forum 
named DarkMarket
40 in 2008. According to an interview with SOCA, Darkmarket was founded by 
Renukanth Subramaniam, who was also a member of Shadowcrew and Carderplanet using an online 
identity called JiLSi. Darkmarket operated as a closed membership forum but and had around 2500 
members. JiLSi attracted the attention of the FBI and an undercover operation was launched. A FBI 
agent named Keith Mularski, known as Master Splynter, infiltrated Darkmarket as a reputable 
spammer who has featured on Spamhaus. He subsequently became the administrator of Darkmarket 
after securing Darkmarket from rivalry attacks.  This gave the FBI great convenience in evidence 
gathering. Since November 2006, Mularski operated the site as an administrator. The operation 
ultimately led to around 60 arrests in a dozen countries including the U.K.. 
The last case study of Western organised cybercrime is the Russian Business Network (RBN) an 
organisation which offered a complete infrastructure to achieve malicious activities (Bizeul 2007). 
The RBN provided a safe haven for cybercriminals for hosting malware, malicious websites as well as 
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/14/darkmarket-online-fraud-trial-wembley 28 
 
illegal content such as child pornography by obfuscating essential domain name registration details as 
well as sheltering them from complaints and take down orders.  
3.2.3  Compare and contrast between China and the West 
According to the 2009 Internet Security report
41 by Kingsoft Security
42, the total revenue from the 
Chinese underground virus production chain is estimated to soon be reaching as much as 10 billion 
RMB (US$1.48 billion). This is far larger than the figure reported in 2008 by Symantec who 
estimated the total amount of the advertised goods they observed was worth approximately US$276 
million
43. By solely looking at the figures, this suggests that the underground economy in China could 
be as much as five times larger than the Western economy. However, one has to bear in mind that the 
way both sets of data are gathered and the scope taken into account are different. Nonetheless, the 
estimation does reveal that the underground economy in China is flourishing.  
Furthermore, it has been reported that an underground malware production chain for mobile devices 
also exist. According to a news report
44 from ChinaByte, the number of detected mobile malware in 
China has been doubling every year since 2006, reaching 1000 variants by the end of 2009. The direct 
damage caused by mobile malware in China is estimated to be worth 20 million RMB (US$2.9 
million). The annual revenue of the mobile malware production chain is conservatively estimated to 
be around 1 billion RMB (US$148 million). In contrast, West security firms do not have such separate 
study and distinguishing for mobile related malware.  
With regards to the case studies documented above, several notable differences are observed: 
  Western cybercriminals has a high preference to use online forums to facilitate carding 
activities but there is no mention of such centralised means being used in China 
  U.S. cybercriminals most often collaborate with Russian speaking counterparts but they also 
collaborate with people from other countries. 
  Western forums also offer tutorials to exchange knowledge. 
  Chinese cybercriminals are mostly prosecuted for producing and disseminating malware 
rather than for carding offences. 
  Chinese cybercriminals mostly operate within China and collaborate with Chinese 
counterparts only. 
  Despite only infecting Chinese users over a short period of time, the infection rate in China 
could be very rapid. E.g. the “Panda” worm which is reported to have infected millions of 
machines over a space of six weeks. 
  Undercover police operation seems to be the preferred method used by both the Chinese and 
the Western law enforcement agencies. 
A more detailed comparison between the Chinese and Western underground economy is given in 
chapter 4. 
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42 Kingsoft Security is one of China’s most popular Internet security software vendors. See: 
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3.3 Organised cybercrime and the underground economy 
As described earlier, there are three main types of cybercrime groups involved in cybercrimes. While 
these groups can be theoretically distinctive, recent cases as shown in section 3.2 suggests that the 
distinction in their involvement in cybercrime are not as clear in reality. Criminal networks have 
emerged where cybercriminals trade with each other and each take on a specialised role (Moore 2009).  
Figure 17 on the next page shows a mapping of the underground economy, which is a generalisation 
of the frameworks of cybercrime in both China and Western countries as discussed in section 3.2. In 
this section, the underground economy will be examined and the role of the major actors in this 
economy will be discussed.   
3.3.1  Labour specialisation, deskilling and reskilling 
In his book Security Engineering, Anderson introduced the economic theories which are often applied 
in computer security. One of the concepts he introduced was Adam Smith‟s theory on how self-
interest in a free market economy leads to economic wellbeing: “specialisation leads to productivity 
gains at all levels from a small factory to international trade, and the self-interested striving of many 
individuals and firms drives progress, as people must produce something others value to survive in a 
competitive market” (Anderson 2008). Cybercriminals have come to realise that profits can be 
maximised by collaborating and trading with other like minded people with different skill sets.  
Wall observes that cybercriminals often deskill and reskill just like those in the labour market. An 
example of deskilling is where the introduction of scripts has led to the automation of hacking which 
was used to be carried out manually (Wall 2008). However, at the same time, the introduction of 
technologies at a rapid pace means that the cybercriminals must reskill themselves in order to be 
familiar with vulnerable technologies and to exploit them to their advantage. An example of this is the 
increasing exploitation of social networks. 
3.3.2  The actors in the underground economy 
As described in the previous section, the underground economy is comprised of many different actors 
offering different products and services, each facilitating the commission of one or more cybercrime. 
In this section, some of the major actors, categorised by the type of products and services they offer to 
the underground economy, are introduced and discussed.   
Referring to figure 17, there are eight major types of products and services offered in the underground 
economy:  
1.  Traditional organised criminal groups 
As described by Choo, the traditional organised criminal groups are those that engage in real world 
crimes such as drug trafficking as well as cybercrimes. These criminals are motivated by profit and 
they are actively seeking money making opportunities in order to expand their wealth. It is this 
motivation which lured them into the online underground economy as cybercrimes become 
increasingly lucrative due to identity theft and fraud. 
2.  Financial crime/identity theft 
Identity-related crime is not a new phenomenon nor is it an Internet specific crime. However, there is 
little doubt that the Internet and other communication technologies have greatly facilitated this type of 
crime due to a rapid increase in the amount of personal information available. More specifically, 
 
 
Figure 17 – generalised mapping of the underground economy  
 
identity-related crime is “a compound concept used to refer to a range of methods used to commit 
specific forms of deception and fraud” (Smith 2010). One example of such activities is carding, which 
refers to “the unauthorized use of credit and debit card account information to fraudulently purchase 
goods and services” (Peretti 2008).   
Referring to figure 17, there are several notable actors in the underground economy who commit 
crimes belonging to this category: 
Bank data stealers: they are the individuals who steal bank data from unsuspecting computer users, 
as described in section 3.3.1. The types of bank data most frequently traded can be found in Appendix 
B. An interesting study by Holz et al. gives an unique insight into how exactly malware such as 
keyloggers are used to steal data (Holz 2008). 
Carders: they are the individuals who are engaged in criminal carding activities using the data listed 
above. 
Plastic vendors and encoders: these are the individuals who sell blank credit cards. They often offer 
packaged services such as encoding and printing fraudulent credit cards for the client. This is a 
preferred method for new carders because this is less costly than having to purchase equipments such 
as an encoder and blank cards. China is a popular source for both types of equipment. 
Cashiers: these are the individuals who perform cash withdrawal from the fraudulently obtained bank 
accounts in person, usually at ATM machines in quiet areas. They are also known as “runners”. 
Scammers: these are the individuals who fabricate a fraudulent story and trick the victims into 
making financial losses. The Nigerian “419 Advance fee” scam is one of the most well known scams 
in recent years. 
3.  Attack services 
The products and services offered in this category are all aimed at attacking the integrity of computers. 
As previously described, the list of crimes belonging to this category includes hacking and cracking, 
vandalising, spying, denial of service, digital piracy and the infection of malware. The major actors in 
this category are: 
Zero-day exploit finders: zero-day refers to the number of days since a software vulnerability has 
been discovered and zero-day exploits refer to the fresh vulnerabilities unknown to anyone. Zero-day 
exploit finders are the individuals whose job is to find previously unknown vulnerabilities in targeted 
applications and would sell such exploits to malware authors. These exploits are the most expensive 
items sold on the underground economy as they would allow infections which would in turn bring 
about a revenue stream. In 2006, one such finder offered to sell a Windows Vista zero-day exploit for 
$50,000 U.S. dollars
45. It has also been suggested that some sells for as much as $120,000 (Muttil 
2008). 
Malware authors: malware, an abbreviation for malicious software are applications designed to 
exploit the vulnerabilities in software applications. There are several types of malware including web-
                                                           





47, virus and worms
48. Competition between malware authors 
also exists. Malware authors do reverse-engineer their rivals‟ malware in order to gain a bigger 
market share on the underground economy (Elser 2009).  
Botnet herders: a botnet is a network of machines compromised bots and a bot is a malware acts 
upon commands received from a command server. 
4.  Delivery services 
The services offered in this category are those which aim to disseminate malware as quickly as 
possible. The major actors in the category are: 
Phishers: these are the people who specialise in creating legitimate looking messages with the aim of 
luring the unsuspecting victim into clicking on a link to visit an infected website or downloading an 
infected attachment. Most often social engineering skills are used to increase the legitimacy of the 
messages. Recently, there is an increasing threat of spear phishing whereby the phisher target specific 
individuals in an organisation. 
Spammers: spammers specialise in mass mailing.  Most often, spammers are also botnet herders and 
they utilise their botnet to send out huge volumes of email. A study on the financial reward from spam 
marketing conversion rate of the Storm botnet was carried out by Kanich et al. (Kanich 2008).  In 
their study, they found that the conversion rate for pharmaceutical spams was well under 0.00001%. 
Using this same rate, the Storm-generated spam would produce roughly 3.5 million U.S. dollars worth 
of revenue in a year. 
Rogue web admins: they are usually administrators who run legitimate websites but are willing to 
infect their website with malware upon receiving financial reward, thus breaching the visitors trust. 
Intruders & crackers: they are the hackers which are force an entry into machines and perform other 
cybercrimes such as spying, vandalising as well as espionage. 
5.  Blended services 
The services in this category are support services which may or may not be illegal. The actors in this 
category are: 
Rogue hosting: these are hosting services aimed at providing a safe haven for malicious activities. 
The Russian Business Network (RBN) is one such service (Bizeul 2007). 
Spoof website designers: these are web designers who are willing to build websites which mirror 
legitimate ones. 
 
                                                           
46 Web-based Trojans: this type of Trojans exploits system or application-level vulnerabilities and opens up a 
backdoor for attackers to infect the compromised machine with other malware.  
47 Conventional Trojans: these Trojans enable the remote control of infected machines (called “flesh chicken” 
in Chinese) and they are also used to steal personal data such as login credentials. 
48 Virus and worm: a virus is a malware which infects a host such as a legitimate application and will self-
replicate and propagate. Worms would also self-propagate but they do not require a host. Both malware could 
be used to alter system or application configurations as well as disabling security measures. 
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6.  Security services 
This category of services aim at providing security services for the cybercriminals such as a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) service, proxies and SOCKs (encrypted proxies) all of which would allow 
cybercriminals to hide their true identity as well as protecting the confidentiality of their 
communications. This type of service is needed by all cybercriminals who wish to be secure. 
7.  Virtual assets trading 
The services in this category are involved in the theft of virtual assets such as avatars, clothes, 
weapons, accessories and most importantly, virtual currency. These assets are most often from 
popular Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPG) such as the World of 
Warcraft (WoW) Second Life and Lineage 2.   
 
People spend a lot of time playing. More than 25 percent of gamers play for more than 30 hours every 
week (Muttil 2008). Since players spend so much time and effort in trying to collect virtual 
commodities, some prosperous gamers are willing to take shortcuts and pay real money to get 
advanced virtual objects to avoid boring routine work, commonly known as “grinding”.  
 
To steal virtual assets, the first step is to steal gamer accounts and login credentials, most often carried 
out by the so-called “Envelope stealers”. Once they have stolen the accounts, they sell the account 
login credentials to the virtual asset traders who would use the information to access the accounts 
(open the envelope) and steal all the virtual assets registered with the account. They would then sell 
the assets to the prosperous gamers.  
 
In China, the most popular MMORPGs include Dungeon N‟ Fighter (DNF) Dragon Nest (DN) XYQ, 
ZT Online Green edition and the Enchanting Shadow. This is an increasingly lucrative business 
because the online gaming market is rapidly booming. Zhuge et al. carried out a study of the virtual 
assets trading via the Taobao 
49online business platform, a Chinese trading platform similar to eBay. 
They found that 1.2 million virtual goods were on sale and 8.9 million exchanges have taken place 
within a six-month period (Zhuge 2008). Finally, they estimated that the market value of the virtual 
asset exchange solely on the Taobao platform is about 223 million RMB (US$33 million). 
  
Furthermore, in China, not only online game assets are valuable. Tencent QQ is not only the most 
popular instant messaging (IM) service but it is also a social network with a wide range of service 
such as online games, avatars and even offers their own electronic currency known as “Q coin”. “Q 
coins” are required if the user wants to purchase extra accessories for his avatar or to gain access to 
certain service, such as creating a QQ group. Upon completing the registration, the user is assigned a 
unique QQ number, just like ICQ in the West. The problem is that there is a real financial value 
attached to some QQ numbers, such as those with fewer digits or contains certain combination of 
numbers e.g. 168888 or 888888. There are some prosperous people who are willing to pay real money 
for these “beautiful” numbers. As a result, cybercriminals recognise this demand and use various 
methods such as phishing and Trojans to steal QQ accounts. Not only are the QQ accounts sellable 
but also the virtual assets registered with account, such as the accessories worn by the avatar and the 
“Q coins”. 
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As mentioned in chapter 2.1, approximately 18.5% of malware infection victims experience theft of 
their online identities which is much higher than the theft of banking related assets. This highlights the 
increasing significance of the ownership of virtual assets. Similar trends are observed in the West 
where gaming Trojans and baking Trojans are found to be nearly as common (Muttil 2008).  
8.  Money laundering 
Money laundering is required for nearly all criminal activities because ultimately, most crimes 
involve some form of financial exchange and the criminals must hide the true source of illicit funds. 
Traditional methods include electronic funds transfer, fictional companies with foreign banks, cash 
smuggling, bank fraud, and informal money exchange brokers. There are two methods which have 
become prevalent in cybercrimes in the West, money mules and exchangers. 
Money mules: these are people who receive proceeds of fraud from compromised bank accounts and 
forward the fund to those controlled by the fraudsters for cashing out. There are two types of money 
mules: innocent mules are those who have no idea that the funds they are forwarding are proceeds of 
fraud; and professional mules are those who knowingly and purposefully provide the money 
laundering service for fraudsters. Money mules are recruited through a variety of methods: 
  Unsolicited emails e.g. spams 
  Classified adverts on legitimate recruitment websites 
  Job vacancies published on fraudulent websites purporting to be a legitimate business 
Attractive job titles such as “Financial Managers” and “Country representatives” are offered to lure 
victims and “no previous experience required” is often stated on the job adverts. 
Just like their Western counterparts, the Chinese cybercriminals, in particular, those committing bank 
frauds, often require overseas “money mules” to launder the proceeds of fraud before cashing out in 
another country. During the course of this study, it was observed that an advert was placed on a QQ 
group recruiting Chinese overseas students in the U.K. to act as money mules, as shown in figure 18 
below.  
 
Figure 18 – advert recruiting Chinese students in the U.K. to act as money mules 35 
 
The advert claims that the group engages in long term advertising campaigns in both the U.S. and 
Europe, thus needing a large number of bank accounts in the U.K. to receive funds on their behalf. 
Participants are offered a 15% return for their service. The advert also claims that there have been 
many successful collaboration cases involving overseas students in London, Manchester and 
Edinburgh.  Furthermore, the advert requests for Neteller
50 accounts because registration is not 
available in China. The advertiser is offering £35 for a normal account and £1 00 for accounts with 
Net+ card. 
Exchangers and Virtual Payment Systems (VPS):  
There are three types of VPS:  
  National currency backed e-currencies: e.g. WebMoney (WMZ – WebMoney dollars) 
  Precious metal such as gold backed e-currencies: e.g. e-Gold, Liberty Reserve and 
WebMoney Gold (WMG) 
  Blended payment systems: e.g. Paypal and Western Union 
The main advantage of the electronic currencies (e-currencies) is that they provide the anonymity 
sought by the cybercriminals and no risk of a chargeback. However, identity verification may be 
required for transferring large sums. E.g. in order to exchange a large sum of WMZ, one would be 
required to perform an identity verification to obtain a WM Passport. This is troublesome for the 
cybercriminals and this is where the exchangers come into the chain. Some exchangers with verified 
accounts who have a large amount of currencies are offering exchange service to the cybercriminals. 
Some are willing to turn a blind eye to the source of funds and preserve the anonymity of the 
cybercriminals.  
In China, the Chinese cybercriminals also use Liberty Reserve and WebMoney for financial exchange. 
However, by performing a simple text based search for “WMZ”, “LR” and “淘宝” (Taobao) within 
the “visa” bar on Baidu Tieba
51, it was found the most preferred method of exchange for Chinese 
cybercriminals is Taobao because the number of carding-related posts mentioning Taobao far exceeds 
the number of posts mentioning the former two. There are two explanations for this: firstly, the listing 
and selling of items on the Taobao platform is free of charge. In order for the carders to exchange, one 
only has to create a fake listing specifying the agreed amount. The buyer could then buy the “item” 
and pay as previously agreed in private conversations. This method is far less costly than using 
WebMoney and Liberty Reserve which often includes charges by intermediary exchangers. The 
second reason is that most Chinese cybercriminals do not trade foreign carders and so, there is simply 
no need to use foreign services. 
Other methods of money laundering are also becoming popular in both China and the West: 
Virtual casinos: online casinos are also used for money laundering (Paget 2009) and from SOCA 
material, it is documented that one of the ways in which online poker can be exploited for money 
laundering is by controlling multiple online identities using virtualisation software so that the risk of 
losing is minimised.  
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Prepaid stored value cards: there are two main types of stored value cards: open system cards and 
closed system cards. Open system cards are those that are reloadable and there are little restrictions on 
where the card could be used but they normally require cardholder‟s name. On the other hand, closed 
system cards like retail store gifts cards restrict owners to use them in designated stores (Choo 2008b). 
There have been several reported incidents which involved the use of stored value cards in an attempt 
to launder money. 
3.4 Chains of need shapes the underground economy 
As shown in figure 17, the underground economy is a network of chains of need where people with 
different skill sets offer their goods and services to satisfy the needs in the market. An example of a 
chain of needs for the carding is as follows: 
The chain begins with the “bank data stealers” recognising the demand for bank data by the 
“carders” and intending to satisfy such need by stealing bank data. In order to do so, the stealers 
begin by paying the “malware authors” to write customised conventional Trojans which are capable 
to stealing personal data from the consumers of specific banks chosen by the stealers After the 
malware has been written, the stealers would then ask the “botnet herders” to install their Trojans on 
to the zombies controlled by the herders. After an agreement has been reached on the price, which is 
usually based on the number of successful installs, the herders would simply add the bank Trojans to 
the list of installs to be planted on their zombies.  After the stealers begin to steal bank data, they 
would then sell their data on to the carders. The carders would then require the services of “money 
mules” or sometimes known as “drops”, which are intermediaries knowingly or unknowingly 










Chapter 4  Understanding and Comparing the Underground Economy 
According to Symantec
52, cybercrime has surpassed illegal drug trafficking as a criminal money-
maker and one in five will become a victim. There is no doubt that cybercrime has become a 
widespread problem for all Internet users. Unfortunately, while Western online black markets have 
been subject to much research since as early as 2000, the Chinese underground economy has rarely 
been studied, with the only prominent work on Chinese underground economy by Zhuge et al. (Zhuge 
2008). Following Symantec‟s report on the Underground Economy (Fossi 2008), a detailed study was 
carried out on the underground economy in China and the findings are documented in this chapter. 
The aim is to provide a direct comparison between the characteristics of the Chinese underground 
economy and the West. 
4.1  Communication and advertising platforms 
As described in section 3.2.2, one of the most distinctive characteristic of Western cybercrimes is the 
use of online forums. From SOCA material as well as the Operation Firewall Indictment (Department 
of Justice 2003), hierarchical management structures are common among carding forums in the West, 
as shown in figure 19 below. 
 
Figure 19 – hierarchical management structure of Western carding forums 
                                                           
52 Cybercrimes has surpassed illegal drug trafficking as a criminal moneymaker, 1 in 5 will become a victim. -
http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20090910_01 38 
 
On the other hand, it has been observed that the Chinese cybercriminals prefer to use more 
decentralised means such as making advertisements on publicly accessible blog posts, groups and 
forums. The author of this thesis asked the Chinese carders why there are no such forums in China 
and one gave the reply saying there is simply no point because they know how quickly foreign 
carding forums are closed down. Indeed as described in section 3.3, the Western carding forums often 
attract too much attention from law enforcement as they become popular. Instead of being part of a 
hierarchical organisation, Chinese cybercriminals prefer forming networks of ephemeral relationships, 
such as those shown in figure 15 in last chapter. The features of the most popular systems used by the 
Chinese cybercriminals which remove the need for forums are described and summarised in this 
section, 
4.1.1  Baidu Tieba 
Baidu is China‟s largest search engine with 63% of the market share
53 in China‟s Web search market. 
However, aside from searching, Baidu also offer various social networking services, most notably the 
Baidu Tieba (贴吧).The Baidu Tieba is a publicly accessible and searchable message board system 
where specific boards (called “bar”) can be freely created with a specific title by a registered user. 
Once the bar is created, it will become searchable within the Baidu Tieba. Users can also apply to be 
the administrator of the bar which would allow him/her to monitor posts as well as removing posts.  
 
Figure 20 – a snapshot of the “visa” tieba on Baidu 
Figure 20 is a snapshot of the “visa” bar, which is the most popular bar for Chinese carders. Anyone 
can make a post on the bar. If the user is registered, his/her username will be shown as the author. If 
the user is not registered, the first three range of his/her IP address is shown in the author‟s field. This 
means users‟ anonymity can be easily preserved. The lack of control of the Baidu Tieba coupled with 
the immense popularity of the Baidu portal itself, makes the Baidu Tieba the most convenient place 
for Chinese cybercriminals to advertise their goods and services as well as requesting for specific 
services. It is partly the reason why there is no need for a closed forum like those used by Western 
carders. A typical sale advert is as shown in figure 21 below. The typical format of an advert on Baidu 
Tieba consists of a short message mainly containing a brief description of the goods and services for 
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sale or request (such as the country and types of credit cards) as well as leaving the QQ number to 
hold further negotiations in private conversations via QQ (see next section for a more detailed 
examination of QQ IM). 
 
Figure 21 – an advert selling credit cards 
While Western carding forums have reviewed vendors, the Chinese carders do not have such 
mechanism. Instead, rippers are posted and shamed on Baidu Tieba, as shown in figure 22 below:
 
Figure 22 – dishonest seller shamed 
Figure 22 shows a post warning others of the ripper. The post contains the ripper‟s QQ username, the 
QQ number and his/her account details on virtual payment system Alipay
54. The details of how the 
victim was ripped are also given.  
Given the ease searching for specific posts on the Baidu Tieba, the Chinese cybercrminals can easily 
protect themselves by performing a search for the QQ number of the potential dealer they are 
intending to deal with, prior to performing any kind of transaction in order to avoid being ripped. 
The following „bars‟ are of particular interests to the underground economy:  
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Table 2 – bars and usage statistics 
Table 2 above shows a number of bars on Baidu Tieba which are used by Chinese cybercriminals as a 
common marketplace where demands for underground services are met by supply. Topics refer to the 
number of new distinctive topics created on the bar while comments are comments made within the 
topics. The topics can be understood as distinctive adverts for underground trading and as shown in 
table 2, there have been growth in the number of topics in all bars over a period of eight weeks. 
Looking at the number of topics, it can be seen that the most popular bars are “visa”, “灰鸽子”, “挂马” 
and “网马”. This pattern also reflects the most popular underground hacking activities in cybercrime 
today. The “visa” bar represents carding activities, “灰鸽子” is the name of the most powerful 
Chinese Trojan used to gain remote control of compromised machines and this represents botnet 
forming activities, “挂马” (infecting legitimate Web pages with malware) is widely understood to be 
the most popular way of delivering malware and “网马” means Web Trojans, which are commonly 
used to exploit vulnerabilities in Web browsers.  
Bar name  Note  26
th July 2010  20
th Sept 2010 
visa  Most popular board for cardings  5823 topics 





Board for remote hacking and 
zombies “flesh chicken” 















Similar to 网站攻击 
 
190 topics 
 4511 comments 
242 topics 
7889 comments 








Advertising hacking services as 
well as requests for services. 
There are also adverts for 
hacking tutorials. 






Intended to gather the highly 
skilled hackers together but 
there are no guarantee that the 
people advertising are indeed. 






This board is for hacker forums. 
However, this board contains 
mostly adverts offering hacking 
services as well as requests for 
services. There are also adverts 
for hacking tutorials. 






This board is about malicious 
code infection on legitimate 
Web pages. This board contains 
services and request for 挂马 as 
well as for general hacking 
 






This board is a place for adverts 
for the sale of zombies. 
 






4.1.2  QQ and QQ Group (群) 
For private conversations, the Chinese cybercriminals prefer to use Tencent‟s QQ Instant Messenger
55 
(IM) as it is the most popular instant messenger in China with over 567million registered users
56. The 
QQ IM operates in similar ways to the ICQ (I Seek You)
57 instant messenger which is popular in the 
West. Each registered is assigned a unique number, known as the QQ number and this number is then 
used to uniquely identify a user. 
Below is a comparison of ICQ‟s user interface with QQ‟s: 
 
Figure 23 – ICQ 7 VS QQ 2010 
Figure 23 shows the user interface of ICQ (on the left) and QQ (on the right). Both display the contact 
list of individual users vertically and the users of either messenger are free to start a conversation with 
any other users. Figure 24 below shows a conversation between two Chinese carders in the middle of 
trading a track 201.  
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Figure 24 – negotiation with a Chinese carder 
However, QQ is more than just an instant messenger.  QQ also offers a social networking service 
called QQ Group and its functionality is identical to that of an IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channel. 
However, unlike an IRC channel which is purely text based, multimedia content including text, 
images and webcam sessions can be used on QQ groups. The web interface of the QQ group service 
simply provides access to all the groups the user belongs to, as shown in figure 25 below: 
 





Figure 26 below shows the interface once inside the group: 
 
Figure 26 – inside a QQ group 
In order to create a QQ group, one would have to pay a fee using “QQ coin”. The exact fee depends 
on the maximum size of the group. The group creator has full administrative control over the group, 
such as deciding whether membership should be open, verified members only or closed. In addition, 
the group administrator has full control of whether group conversations should be kept.  
 
Figure 27 – QQ IM interface for QQ groups 44 
 
There are various sub-functions within a QQ group including a group photo gallery, a summary of 
recent dialogues, a forum (which the carders do not use) and records of all members and their contact 
details, as shown in figure 26. Moreover, QQ groups are not only accessible via its web interface. The 
QQ messenger allows group members to communicate with other members instantly. In figure 27 
above, the conversation box for the QQ group is shown on the left while the list of QQ groups the user 
belongs to is shown on the right. The interface is almost identical to the interface for private 
conversations and group members are notified of any new comments on the group in the same way as 
they are notified of any private messages.  
It has been demonstrated in this section that the QQ messenger is a very powerful communication tool 
equivalent to the combination of the ICQ and an IRC client in the West. Furthermore, the QQ 
messenger and the QQ group service allow the Chinese cybercriminals to form closed communities 
with the luxury of instant messaging each other. With the loose control of the Baidu Tieba for posting 
advertisements to attract new carders, it is easy to see why there is little need for the Chinese carders 
to operate private carding forums. 
4.1.3  Online forums (BBS) 
Although forums are not popular for carding in China, it has been observed during this investigation 
that one Chinese carding forum was launched, as shown in figure 28 below: 
 
Figure 28 – a screenshot of fuckbank.tk 
The forum is called “fuckbank” (http://www.fuckbank.tk) and it was first advertised on the „visa‟ bar 
on Baidu Tieba by a user named “lookthebank”
58 on the 20
th July, 2010. The advertiser hid the URL 
in an image on his Baidu profile to prevent it from being indexed and searched. The site was also seen 
to have been promoted on QQ groups by two QQ users: 法克 Bank (#79047314) and白板 
(#404493144).  
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Fuckbank is a forum akin to those observed in the West with similar layout as well as functions 
offered. There are sub-forums for reviewed vendors, trading, rippers reporting as well as knowledge 
exchange sections related to dumps, CVV and international online financial institutions such as 
WebMoney. Membership is free and open to anyone although access to the content posted does not 
require membership at all. The forum also offers a quick access to an online ICQ service called “icq 2 
go”, perhaps to facilitate communication for carders using ICQ. These identical features suggests that 
the administrator has had affiliations with Western carding forums and has now launched his very 
own Chinese carding forum using the layout he has observed from the Western forums.  
Lastly, since it hass been first advertised, the membership has seen very slow growth with only 52 
members being recorded on 20
th Sept., 2010.  This supports the argument above that Chinese carders 
prefer the use of less centralised services such as Baidu Tieba and QQ groups. 
4.1.4  Taobao 
Taobao
59 is China‟s biggest online trading platform akin to eBay in the West. Users be sellers and sell 
items or be buyers and purchase items. While eBay is affiliated with Paypal, Taobao is mainly 
affiliated with Alipay
60, the Chinese equivalent of Paypal. During this investigation, underground 
economy goods have been observed to be traded openly on Taobao, as shown in figure 29 below: 
 
Figure 29 – “flesh chicken” sold on Taobao 
Figure 29 shows an advert selling compromised machines for 0.2 RMB per machine and there have 
been 1209 sales in the last 30 days. While it is stated in the terms and conditions that such goods are 
not permitted, enforcement appears to be very lax. 
Taobao is a popular place for Chinese cybercriminals because there are no admin charges for sellers 
and buyers have the power to review the purchased goods before instructing the payment system, 
Alipay, to forward the paid funds to the seller to complete the transaction. 
4.2  Advertised Goods and Services  
                                                           
59 Taobao – http://www.taobao.com  
60 Alipay – https://www.alipay.com  46 
 
This section details some of the goods and services which have been advertised during the 
investigation. In the list below, all listed prices are in US dollars. Due to the nature of the way 
Chinese cybercrminals advertise their goods and services as described in the previous section, the 
prices offered by Chinese cybercriminals were mostly obtained from private negotiations, unlike those 
obtained in Franklin and Paxson‟s work where they correlated prices by parsing IRC messages using 
natural language processing (Franklin 2007). The Western prices are drawn from Symantec‟s study of 
the underground economy (Fossi 2008) as well as (Symantec 2010). 
4.2.1  Financial goods and services 
Financial goods and services directly related to carding, such as those documented in appendix B.  
 
Table 3 – financial goods and services offered 
Table 3 above shows a comparison between the prices documented in Symantec‟s reports on the 
underground economy with the prices of similar goods offered by Chinese cybercriminals. An overall 
observation is that the prices offered in China generally fall within the range observed by Symantec in 
the West and this is because Chinese carders do not just trade among themselves but they also trade 
with foreign carders. As shown in figure 30 below, one interesting observation made during this 
investigation the Chinese carders‟ frequent use of foreign carding sites which sell carding 
Goods   Western Price 
(USD) 
CN Price (USD) per unit 
UK credit cards + cvv2  $0.50 - $12  Normal - $3.7 - $5 
With 3D- $22 - $44 
US credit cards + cvv2  $0.50 - $12  Normal –  $1.7 - $2 
EU credit cards + cvv2 e.g. DE FR  $0.50 - $12  Normal –  FR $5.9 
CN credit cards + cvv2  $0.50 - $12  Normal – $17 
UK 101/201  N/A  Track 101: 
Classic  = $1.47 per track 
 Gold  = $1.76 per track 
Platinum = $2.06 per track 
 
Track 201: 
Classic = $1.34 to 1.63 per track 
Gold = $1.63 to $2.08 per track 
Platinum = $1.93 to $2.53 per track 
U.S. Discover = $15 
US 101/201  N/A  Track 101: 
Classic  = $1.26 per track 
Gold = $0.89 to $1.71 per track 
Platinum = $1.19 to $1.937 per track 
FR 101/201  N/A  Track 201: 
V/M = $11.9 per track 
Japan 101/201  N/A  Track 201: 
JCB = $14.89 
V/M = $10.42 
Dumps  $4 - $150  $74.46 
Bank logins  $15 - $850  Bank BOA Us : 
 Balance $7000 = $300 
Balance $14000= $500 
Balance $18000 = $800 
 
Bank HSBC (US ): 
Balance $12000 = 400 
 Balance $28000 = 1000 
 
Bank HSBC (UK) : 
Balance GBP 8000 = $300 
Balance GBP 17000 = $700 
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merchandises such as tracks and dumps (see Appendix B) just like normal online commerce sites 
where wanted goods can be added to a user basket and the user can check out and pay once finished. 
Using such sites, no communication is necessary and there is no doubt such sites are bring carders 
from around the world into a unified global carding underground economy. 
 
Figure 30 - interface of carding site ltdcc.com 
Several other key observations include: 
  U.S. goods such as Credit Card + CVV2 and tracks are the cheapest compared with other 
countries. 
  The price of Chinese Credit Card + CVV2 is above the range documented by Symantec, 
possibly due to the scarcity of Chinese credit card data relative to the availability of foreign 
data. 
  Cards with 3D credentials are approximately 7-8 times more than normal cards. A possible 
explanation is that 3D credentials would give the carders great convenience to cash-out as the 
cards can be used for online purchasing. 
  The relative low prices of UK and US goods suggest that they are more often targeted than 
other countries such as France and Japan. 
4.2.2  Malware 
Malware refer to the malicious softwares that are used to exploit vulnerabilities to install more 
malware, steal data as well as gaining remote control of compromised machines.  
Table 4 – prices of malware observed in Chinese underground economy 
Goods   Western price (USD)  CN Price (USD) per unit 




N/A  Guaranteed effective: 
For 10 days = $14.89 
For one month = $29.78 to $44.67 
Trojan generator  N/A  $4.46 - $298 
 48 
 
Table 4 above shows that the Trojans targeting the Chinese banks ICBC and BC (see appendix A) are 
valued at $22.33 which falls within the range of the prices observed by Symantec in the West. 
Although these Trojans targets Chinese banks, their prices are similar to that in the West which 
suggests that the technical difficulties in needing to steal the data as well as the security of the online 
banking data are similar to that in the West. During the investigation, it was also observed that QQ 
Trojan generators were offered for as little as $4.46 and this may suggest why more QQ credentials 
are stolen than bank logins, as documented in section 2.2. Also, the low pricing of the generator could 
also suggest that there is a high supply for this kind of product.  
4.2.3  Technical Support Services 
Technical support services refer to those that provide the technical tools or services which would 
facilitate the commission cybercrimes. From table 5, it can be seen that the sale of zombies 
(compromised computers) are priced depending on their location e.g. household or Internet café  as 
well as whether webcam control. It can be seen that those with webcam control are nearly twice as 
expensive as those without. 
Table 5 – prices of technical services offered 
In the West, it has been noted by SOCA that a botnet including hosting could be sold for $550. In 
China though, botnets are rarely sold as a whole. Rather, zombies are sold individually or as a batch. 
There are also different prices depending on whether there is webcam control, where the webcam is 
facing and whether the user is female. 
 
For the purpose of research, the author of the thesis made enquiries to two DDoS attackers about the 
typical price for a DDoS attack on a UK online casino for a period of 24 hours. An online casino was 
chosen because casinos are often targeted in online extortions. Subsequently, two different prices, $89 
and $298 were offered. One explanation for the significant difference between the two offers may be 
attributed to the size of the botnets controlled by each of the attackers. The one with a bigger botnet 
would be able to offer lower prices because the attack would occupy less of his resources. Comparing 
with similar kinds of attack in the West, the prices from China are generally beyond the typical 
Western price range. Several possible explanations for this observation: first is that this may suggest 
the botnet sizes held by Chinese DDoS attackers may be smaller than those monitored in the West; 
secondly, there may be less DDoS attackers in China than in the West. 
 
Lastly, Chinese cybercriminals were often seen offering private tutorials to newcomers and the prices 
observed are shown in table 5. As can be seen, the prices are very low when compared with the 
possible reward after learning the techniques required for committing cybercrimes and this is 
worrying because this further lowers the barrier to entry to cybercrime. 
Services   Western Price (USD)  CN Price (USD) per unit 
Zombie sales  A botnet can be sold for 
$550 including hosting 
$0.11 – $0.22 per zombie 
$15 for 1000 household zombies 
$15 for 1500 traffic 
zombies/Internet café  zombies 
$15 for 500-700 zombies with 
webcam control 
DDoS attacks (DDoS攻击)  $60 - $80 per day  $89 to$298 (24 hour attack) 
Money laundering/Mule 
service/Cashier 
N/A  50:50 split 
Hacking training/tutorial  N/A  $22 to $149 (per student) 
IP address  N/A  10,000 IPs = $18 
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Chapter 5  Conclusion 
With 420 million Internet users, China has now become the world‟s largest Internet population. In 
terms of Internet security, this means that the security of the Chinese Internet is significant to the 
global Internet and this is why cybercrime in China has been studied in this thesis. 
Cybercrime, as observed by Western scholars and security experts, is a phenomenon which has arisen 
from many different factors from both social and technical aspects. It has been observed during this 
study that the most influential motivations for Chinese cybercriminals are political and economical.  
According to CNNIC, 94.9% of all Internet users have a monthly average salary below 5000 RMB 
(£ 479) which is equivalent to the average weekly income in the U.K.. Furthermore, around 30% of the 
Internet population in China are students have an average monthly income of less than 500 RMB per 
month (£ 47). Yet, the commodities in China are not always cheap and some even costs the same as in 
the U.K.. Coupled with widely reported news of the lucrative nature of cybercrime, it is easy to 
understand why cybercriminals have emerged in China.  
Chinese hackers are always perceived by the Western media as mystical and powerful. In this thesis, 
the Chinese hacking community and hacktivism was examined. Chinese politically motivated hackers, 
the Chinese hacktivists, emerged as early as 1997. Several key cyberconflicts have seen a few large 
organised hacktivitst groups disband and many new smaller hacker groups emerge.  Coincidentally, a 
cyberconflict against Japan occurred during the course of this study. This incident has shown that 
Chinese hacktivism is not a myth and there are hackers out there who would launch organised attacks 
against foreign national Internet infrastructures in response to political matters. However, the problem 
appears not to be as widespread as some may fear. Despite evidence of a large hacking community in 
China, most hacker forums in China have shown no affiliation with Chinese cyberattacks on Japanese 
websites, only those who publicly claim to be hacktivists. Furthermore, even the hacktivists 
themselves disagree over the value in launching cyberattacks against websites. Lastly, it has been 
observed that the Chinese government do intervene with such hacktivism but leniency is shown 
towards the hacktivists. 
As summarised in chapter two, there are three major types of cybercrimes: computer assisted crimes, 
pure computer crimes and computer content crime. These three types also give rise to three major 
types of criminals on the Internet: traditional organised criminals, cybercriminals and ideologically 
and politically motivated criminals. As cybercrime evolve, networks of chains of need have formed 
and an underground economy has emerged where labour is continuously deskilled and reskilled. 
By studying news reports of the most high profile cybercrime cases in both China and the West, it can 
be concluded not only does organised crime exists in China, the nature of the Chinese underground 
economy is just as well defined as those observed in the West. In fact, the size of the Chinese 
underground economy may be much larger than that of the West because it has been estimated by 
Chinese security experts that the potential worth of the Chinese underground economy would soon 
reach 10billion RMB (US$1.48 billion). This is far larger than the figure reported in 2008 by 
Symantec who estimated the total amount of the advertised goods they observed was worth 
approximately US$276 million.  
Lastly in chapter four, a detailed investigation into the Chinese underground economy has exposed the 
ways in which Chinese cybercriminals trade, which were found to be significantly different from the 
observations made in the West. It has been found that the Chinese cybercriminals prefer to form 
ephemeral relations and use more decentralised means to trade with each other, such as services 50 
 
offered by Baidu Tieba and QQ. Underground economy goods have also been observed to be openly 
traded on reputable trading platform such as Taobao.  This is in direct contrast to their Western 
counterparts who mostly trade using online forums. This is further supported by the slow emergence 
of a Chinese carding forum called fuckbank. Despite intense advertising as well as free open 
membership, it has only managed to attract 52 members after nearly two months since launched. This 
could perhaps be the reason why the Chinese underground economy could be as big as it has been 
estimated. 
Finally, the prices of some of the commonly traded underground economy goods were obtained 
through private conversations with Chinese cybercriminals. It was found that in general, carding 
merchandises are priced similarly in China and in the West. One explanation is the availability of 
carding websites which operate in similar formats as e-commerce websites where wanted goods are 
added to user baskets and checkout when finish. Such sites eliminate the need for negotiations, thus 
removing tradition boundaries such as language and location boundaries. This suggests that carding in 
the West and China may not be as clearly segregated as this study has set out to be and that the 
Chinese cybercriminals do trade with Western cybercriminals. This further supports the view that 
cybercrimes are not bounded by traditional boundaries and that it is a truly global phenomenon. With 
regards to malware and technical support services, small variations in prices between the West and 
China were observed and this may be due to the need for more detailed negotiations and specific 
targets such as Chinese applications. Thus, the language barrier can still be an important boundary 
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Appendix A - Useful Chinese terms 
Goods, services and other related terms: 
Chinese  English 
虚拟社会  Virtual society/world 
计算机  Computer 
互联网  Internet 
网站  Website 
网民  Netizens 
骗子  Trickster 
黑客  Hacker 
地下经济  Underground economy 
地下黑市  Underground market 
地下黑色经济产业链  Underground black economy production chain 
银行  Bank 
银行卡  Bank card 
信用卡  Credit card 
信用虚拟卡  Virtual credit card 
普卡, 金卡,白金卡  Normal, gold, platinum credit card 
3D卡  Credit card with 3D credentials 
磁道信息/卡料  Exact copy of the magnetic stripe 
101/201  Track 101/Track 201 
内料  Dumps from within China 
外料  Dumps from outside China 
游戏点卡  Gaming points card 
平台  Platform 
外掛/插件  Plug-in 
肉鸡  Zombie machine 
木马  Trojan 
木马免杀  Preventing a Trojan from being destroyed (anti anti-virus) 
数据库  Database 
系统  System 
流程  Flow 
一手  First hand 
身份证  Identity card 
生成器  Generator 
数据  Data 
质量  Quality 
技术  Technique 
服务  Service 
QQ号  The user ID for the QQ instant messenger 
金融  Finance 
信誉  Reputation 
额度  Credit limit 
复制器  Copier 
服务器  Server 55 
 
采集器  Eavesdropper 
额度  Credit card limit 
刀  (=美元)  American dollar 
W  The abbreviation for the Chinese pin yin of 10,000 e.g. 2W = 20k 
 
Actions: 
Chinese  English 
充卡  Carding 
破解  Cracking 
交易  Trading 
攻击  Attacking 
钓鱼  Phishing 
储蓄  Saving 
入侵  Intruding 
收买/收购  Buying/Requesting 
卖  Selling 
出售  For sale 
刷  Swipe 
合作  Collaborating 
求  Requesting/begging 
培训  Training 
聊天  Chatting 
防范  Defending/Defence 
接货  Drop 
汇钱  Money transfer 
取钱  Money withdrawal 
威胁  Threaten 
远控  Remote control 
 
Some abbreviations for virtual payment systems: 
PP  Paypal 
MB  Moneybooker 
C2P  Click2Pay 
LR  Liberty Reserve 
WM  WebMoney (including WMZ) 
 
Slangs are found to take the pin yin of the initials of the names of the banks. They could well be used 
to refer to banks, although no such usage has been observed. 
Chinese name  English name  Abbrev.  Chinese slang 
中国工商银行  Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China 
ICBC  “爱存不存” 
中国建设银行  Construction Bank of China  CBC  “存不存？" 
中国银行  Bank of China  BC  "不存。" 
中国农业银行  Agriculture Bank of China  ABC  "啊,不存！" 56 
 
招行银行  China Merchants Bank  CMBC  "存吗？？白痴！" 
兴业银行  Industrial Bank  CIB  "存一百。" 
国家开发银行  China Development Bank  CDB  "存点吧！" 
北京市商业银行  Beijing City commercial 
Bank 
BCCB  "白存存不？" 
汇丰银行  Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation 


















Appendix B – Carding merchandises 
Dumps: generally refers to information electronically copied from the magnetic stripe on the back of 
credit and debit cards. This is referred to as “full-track data” by the banking industry, referencing the 
two tracks of data (Track 1 and Track 2 on the magnetic stripe) (Peretti 2008). Dumps for sale often 
contain at least track 2 data but often contain both tracks. 
Track 1 (also known as 101): contains the customer‟s name and account number.  
Track 2 (also known as 201): contains the account number, expiration date and the secure code (CVV) 
and discretionary institution data. This is to prevent “card present” fraud. 
Credit card number (CC): this refers to the number on the face of the credit card. In order for a carder 
to engage in card present fraud, he must have CC + CVV. 
CVV2: refers to the 3 to 4 digits printed on the back of a card. This is used to deter card-not-present 
frauds.  
3D: this refers to the authentication details required by an additional security mechanism called 3-D 
Secure. It is designed to protect online payments. 3-D Secure service is offered as Verified by Visa, 
MasterCard SecureCode and J/Secure for Visa, MasterCard and JCB cards respectively. 
Fulls or fullz: this refers to a package of personal identifying data about a victim including address, 
phone number, social security number, credit history report and mother‟s maiden name. 
 